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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
When I served as a member of the federal Advisory Committee on Civil 
Rules in the 1990s, among other proposals the Committee considered were 
possible changes to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 on class actions.  I 
brashly asked at one point whether we had information about what if any 
significant variations existed in state class-action rules and statutes.  My best 
recollection is that the response was a somewhat guilty silence, and that we 
proceeded to consider revisions to the federal rule without looking at state 
practice—which none of us had time to research.1  This symposium gives me 
 
 ∗  Elvin R. Latty Professor of Law Emeritus, Duke University School of Law. 
 1. By way of mitigation, two leading references--on which I rely extensively in this Article--were not 
available then:  See Linda S. Mullenix, STATE CLASS ACTIONS: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (2000, 
with annual updates to 2007; the Mullenix treatise is divided into two volumes, hereafter cited as 1 or 
2); SURVEY OF STATE CLASS ACTION LAW, an annual report of the State Laws Subcommittee of the 
Class Actions and Derivative Suits Committee of the ABA Section of Litigation.  The annual Survey 
seems to have begun appearing in 2001.  See
http://catalog.library.duke.edu/F/K6E4HIFFIT4EP6B4AI36EKPL4YNC4EYARN9ERXN7FR6IK2
MHSE-07657?func=find-acc&acc_sequence=082106274  (accessed Nov. 22, 2007). 
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the welcome if belated opportunity to remedy that knowledge gap.  I hope that 
an exploration of state—and some foreign—class-action rules with an eye to 
key differences from and alternatives to Federal Rule 23 will be not just of 
academic interest but of use to federal, state, and foreign rulemakers when they 
consider whether to change their own rules. 
 
A. Widespread Tracking of 1966 Version of Federal Rule 23 
 
A first point I should make clear is that a considerable majority of 
American states track Federal Rule 23, at least in its 1966 version before the 
1998 and 2003 amendments and the 2007 style revisions, closely and in a good 
many cases word for word.2  In addition, some states explicitly draw on Federal 
Rule 23 case law even when state language does not closely parallel the federal 
text.3  So significant variations from the 1966-style federal rule—apart from 
states not having tracked the recent amendments—do not exist in profusion, but 
there are several including some quite interesting and thoughtful provisions.  I 
plan to give a quick survey of major variations and then discuss those of 
particular significance or interest in more detail later. 
 
B. Significant State Variations 
 
1.  No class-action rule   
 
A first variant is not having any general class-action rule.  Only 
Mississippi4 and Virginia5 fall into this category.  Each does have partial if 
quite limited exceptions: Mississippi plaintiffs may be—or may have been—
able to make liberal use of non-class permissive-party joinder.6  And Virginia 
 
 2. See generally 1 Mullenix, supra n. 1, at xi (“after the Advisory Committee amended Federal Rule 23 
in 1966, many states amended their class action rules, adopting provisions similar to the revised 
federal class action rule.”). 
 3. See e.g. id. Cal. § 1.03, at 6013 (“Section 382 [the general provision of the California Civil 
Procedure Code authorizing class actions] and Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 bear no relation to one another 
except that decisions pursuant to Rule 23 are helpful in the determination of cases brought under 
Section 382.”) (footnote omitted); American Bar Association, Section of Litigation, Survey of State 
Class Action Law 2007 at 39 (hereafter “Survey”): 
 While California’s legislature has never formally adopted Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure . . . the California Supreme Court has effectively tapped it as a resource, both by direct 
reliance upon the rule and upon federal decisions interpreting it. 
 See also e.g. infra n. 20 and accompanying text (N.C.); text accompanying note 15 (Wis.). 
 4. See 1 Mullenix, supra n. 1, Miss. § 1.03(A), at 26,011 (“In enacting its Rules of Civil Procedure, the 
Mississippi Supreme Court intentionally omitted Rule 23, which would have covered class actions . . 
.  [T]he court has since reaffirmed that class actions are not available in Mississippi under any 
circumstances.”) (footnotes omitted); Survey, supra n. 3, at 275 (“The Mississippi rules contain no 
section permitting class actions.”). 
 5. See 2 Mullenix, supra n. 1, Va. § 1.01, at 48,011 (“Virginia does not have a state class action rule”) 
(footnote omitted); Survey, supra n. 3, at 516 (“There is no class action under state law in 
Virginia.”). 
 6. See 1 Mullenix, supra n. 1, Miss. § 1.03(A), at 26,011 (footnote omitted): 
 [P]laintiffs have increasingly attempted to utilize Miss R. Civ. P. 20, which governs joinder, in order 
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statute allows “condominium, time-share, and property owners’ associations to 
bring class actions on behalf of their members.”7  Virginia also has “a Multi 
Claimant Litigation Act, which provides a means to join, coordinate, 
consolidate, or transfer six or more civil actions.”8  Further, in Virginia “[t]here 
is also case law addressing the equity proceeding known as ‘parties by 
representation,’”9 a remotely possible carry-over from earlier practice allowing 
“one or more named parties to represent a larger group.”10  But in both states 
the exceptions are at best quite limited, and it seems fair to say that anyone 
wanting to engage in class-action practice in Mississippi or Virginia must find 
one or another basis for federal-court jurisdiction. 
 
2.  Field-Code provisions   
 
Three states—California, Nebraska, and Wisconsin—retain short class-
action provisions based on the nineteenth-century Field Code.  Nebraska’s 
statute is illustrative. When the question is one of a common or general interest 
of many persons, or when the parties are very numerous, and it may be 
impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or more may sue or defend 
for the benefit of all.11 
Practice under these provisions appears to vary considerably.  “[T]he 
Nebraska Supreme Court has construed the statute in such a way that bringing a 
successful class action suit in Nebraska [state court] is difficult.”12  Wisconsin 
case law under the state’s parallel provision13 is somewhat scant14 but fairly 
friendly to class certification, looking to federal-court constructions of Federal 
Rule 23 for non-binding guidance but requiring only commonality, adequate 
representation, and numerosity as criteria for class certification.15  California 
 
to consolidate numerous claims into one proceeding . . .  Although trial courts have broad discretion 
to join claims, the Mississippi Supreme Court has made it clear that joining parties where the 
requirements of Rule 20 are not satisfied constitutes an abuse of discretion. 
 Recent developments, however, may have made liberal permissive joinder a thing of the past; 
“liberal joinder of individual claims has given way to a strict construction.” Survey, supra n. 3, at 
276. 
 7. 2 Mullenix, supra n. 1, Va. § 1.01, at 48,011 (footnote omitted). 
 8. Survey, supra n. 3, at 516. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. at 517.  But see generally id. at 517-518 (discussing cases and citing only one under a century old, 
and none under 65 years old). 
 11. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-319 (2004). 
 12. Survey, supra n. 3, at 303 (citing C.L. Robinson & Thomas H. Dahlk, Class Actions—The Nebraska 
Procedure, 61 NEB. L. REV. 30 (1982)); See id. at 30-31 (footnote omitted) (“the Nebraska class 
action statute is much more restrictive than Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and has 
seldom been applied by the Nebraska Supreme Court in a manner favorable to the plaintiff.”)  
Despite the age of the Robinson & Dahlk article, from the paucity of Nebraska state-court class-
action activity reported in the ABA survey their statement appears to reflect current reality.  See 
Survey, supra n. 3, at 303-305. 
 13. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 803.08 (West 1994). 
 14. Survey, supra n. 3, at 542. 
 15. See id. at 538. 
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has a lively class-action practice under its Field-Code provision,16 drawing 
significantly on interpretations of Federal Rule 23.17  Both California and 
Wisconsin also have consumer-protection statutes that authorize class actions 
and track much of the language of the Federal Rule.18 
 
3.  North Carolina’s pre-1966 Federal Rule language   
 
North Carolina stands alone among the states in retaining language 
drawn from the pre-1966 federal text (but somewhat similar to Field-Code 
provisions) for its class-action rule: 
If persons constituting a class are so numerous as to make it 
impracticable to bring them all before the court, such of them, one or 
more, as will fairly insure the adequate representation of all may, on 
behalf of all, sue or be sued.19 
North Carolina practice, despite the use of text that does not track the 
current federal rule, relies significantly on concepts from and case law 
construing modern Federal Rule 23.20 
 
4.  Uniform Class Actions Act (UCAA) or Model Class Action Rule 
states   
 
Although the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws (NCCUSL) approved its Uniform Class Actions Act/Model Class Action 
Rule in 1976,21 the dominance of the Federal-Rule model has been such that 
only two states—Iowa and North Dakota—have adopted it.  The UCAA is 
somewhat more detailed than Federal Rule 23, with some novel and thoughtful 
provisions that will be discussed later in coverage of specific variations. 
 
5.   Pennsylvania’s hybrid rules   
 
Pennsylvania has a set of class-action rules22 that are a hybrid of Federal 
 
 16. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 382 (West 2004). 
 17. See Survey, supra n. 3. 
 18. See Cal. Civ. Code  § 1781 (West 1998); Wis. Stat. Ann § 426.110 (West 2005). 
 19. N.C. R. Civ. P. 23(a).  Compare id. with Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a), 308 U.S. 663, 689 (1938) (identical 
language up to end of North Carolina text but continuing with categories of class actions). 
 20. See e.g. Pitts v. Am. Sec. Ins. Co., 144 N.C. App. 1, 10-12 (2001) (identifying as basic prerequisites 
for class certification existence of class, adequate representation, and numerosity, with common issue 
of law or fact and its predominance over individual issues as necessary for existence of class; 
requiring finding of superiority of class action once prerequisites satisfied; viewing federal cases and 
reference as possibly instructive although not binding), aff’d by an equally divided Court, 356 N.C. 
292 (2002) (per curiam).  Affirmances by an equally divided North Carolina Supreme Court leave 
the decision below standing but without precedential value, see id. at 293; the relevant parts of the 
Court of Appeals’ Pitts opinion appear, though, to distill North Carolina law accurately. 
 21. See Survey, supra n. 3, at 169. 
 22. Pa. R. Civ. P. 1701-16. 
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Rule and UCAA provisions, plus some rules that appear to be unique to 
Pennsylvania.  I postpone discussion of the Pennsylvania variations, which 
include some quite thoughtful provisions that could bear consideration 
elsewhere, for the category-by-category treatment that follows in Parts II-VII.23 
 
C. Major Areas in Which Significant Numbers of States Differ from 
Federal Rule 23 
 
Again, the dominant pattern is that most states more or less track the 
1966 version of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, with much drawing on 
federal case law although without a sense of obligation to follow decisions 
interpreting and applying the federal rule.  Even in some states with Federal 
Rule-based provisions, though, and in some with more independent approaches, 
in text or in practice states do vary to some extent from federal language and 
interpretations.  I will survey the non-trivial variations that my research has 
found but pause here to highlight what may be the three most important.  First, 
a few states do not have the typicality requirement of Federal Rule 23(a)(3).24  
Second and more significantly, several states and foreign jurisdictions do not 
apply the requirement of Federal Rule 23(b)(3) that common issues 
predominate over individual ones with the zeal of some federal courts, or lack 
the requirement to begin with.25  Third, in a considerable variety of ways 
several states water down the rigorous requirement of Federal Rule 23(c)(2)(B) 
that for Rule 23(b)(3) common-question class actions “the court must direct to 
class members the best notice that is practicable under the circumstances, 
including individual notice to all members who can be identified through 
reasonable effort.”26 
 
D. No Formal Certification Requirement in Australian Federal Class 
Actions 
 
As a reminder not to confuse the familiar with the necessary, it is 
instructive to consider a key feature of Australian federal class-action practice.  
In American class litigation, we are accustomed to a more or less early court 
ruling on whether to certify an action for class status, which is often a heavily 
contested, make-or-break decision.  Looking at that experience in the United 
States and elsewhere, Australian law reformers successfully argued against an 
up-front certification requirement.  Instead, a class action in the Australian 
federal court system is properly commenced if it meets only numerosity and 
 
 23. For a summary of differences between Federal Rule 23 and the Pennsylvania rules, see Survey, supra 
n. 3, at 423-425. 
 24. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3) (class action permissible only if, inter alia, “the claims or defenses of the 
representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class.”)  For discussion of American 
states and foreign jurisdiction that appear not to require typicality, see infra Part II-D. 
 25. See infra Parts III-B-2 (predominance), V (issue classing). 
 26. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B).  For discussion of the variations from the federal notice requirement, see 
infra Part VI-A. 
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commonality requirements, with contest over appropriateness of the class form 
coming later in connection with decisions on propriety of particular procedural 
steps or on challenge by the defendant.  This reverse approach of proceeding in 
class form unless the court decides otherwise does not, however, appear to have 
been particularly successful or to have drawn much imitation.27 
 
II.  PREREQUISITES 
 
A. Definability 
 
It is often said that an implicit first prerequisite for a federal class action 
is that there must exist a sufficiently identifiable class.28  Louisiana, alone 
among the states insofar as I have seen, makes this requirement explicit: 
One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative 
parties on behalf of all, only if: 
. . . 
(5)  The class is or may be defined objectively in terms of 
ascertainable criteria, such that the court may determine the 
constituency of the class for purposes of the conclusiveness of any 
judgment that may be entered in the case.29 
Practice under this provision appears to be fairly flexible.  “Although 
the definition must adequately describe the class, those seeking certification are 
not required to identify every potential class member.”30  And while defining an 
affected geographical area may be needed, precise geographical definition is 
not always essential.31  Redefinition after an inadequate initial definition is 
possible,32 as is redefinition in light of evidence coming into the record as the 
case proceeds—which tends to insulate initial certifications from appellate 
challenges based on claims of inadequate definition.33 
 
B. Numerosity 
 
Numerosity requirements of some sort for class treatment are of course 
universal, at least in the limited sense that a claim by or against a sole party 
cannot involve a “class” on the relevant side of a case.  In American state class 
actions, I have not found significant variations from the federal practice 
 
 27. See Rachael Mulheron, The Class Action in Common Law Legal Systems: A Comparative 
Perspective at 23-29 (Hart Publishing 2004).  The Australian numerosity requirement is notably 
low—seven or more class members with claims against the same defendant.  See id. at 117.  Only 
Sweden appears now to use the no-certification approach.  See id. at 24. 
 28. See e.g. 5 James Wm. Moore et al., MOORE’S FED. PRAC. § 23.21 (3d ed. 2007). 
 29. La. Code Civ. P. Ann. art. 591(A) (1999). 
 30. 1 Mullenix, supra n. 1, La. § 4.01(A), at 20,035 (footnote omitted). 
 31. See id. 
 32. See id. at 20,036. 
 33. See id. 
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requiring a finding of some number making joinder of all members 
impracticable.  The more divergent alternatives appear in some foreign 
systems, where rather small specific numbers sometimes suffice rather than the 
indefinite, sizeable numbers required in the United States.  Australia’s federal 
regime requires just seven or more members,34 and the number in Ontario and 
British Columbia is as small as possible—”an identifiable class of two or more 
persons.”35  Having this minimal number does not appear to result in 
certification of very small classes, though; it may have the salutary effect of 
eliminating litigation over class size and channeling it instead into whether the 
class form would be preferable to alternatives for dealing with common 
issues.36  American imitation of such an approach seems unlikely, but it can at 
least serve as a helpful reminder of the possibility of de-emphasizing litigation 
over numbers and placing more weight on the suitability of class proceedings 
for the case before a court.  De-emphasizing sheer numbers could also ease the 
use of subclassing if dividing a larger class resulted in some groups that might 
have difficulty meeting a numerosity requirement on their own. 
 
C. Commonality 
 
Without some common issue of law or fact between class members, no 
basis for class litigation exists.  With just one exception I have found nothing 
worthy of note on different treatments of the basic commonality prerequisite, as 
opposed to the requirement of predominance of common over individual 
issues.37  The exception is that Australia’s federal regime makes it explicit that 
class proceedings are permissible even if separate transactions, acts, or 
omissions are involved, as long as they arose out of related circumstances and 
involve a substantial common issue of law or fact.38 
 
D. Typicality 
 
The federal prerequisite that “the claims or defenses of the 
representative parties [be] typical of the claims or defenses of the class”39 is 
also widespread in American state practice.  The requirement may serve some 
valuable functions in preventing outlier representatives and trying to assure that 
class representatives keep the interests of class members at least somewhat to 
heart.  However, it tends to merge to some degree with the requisites of 
 
 34. See Mulheron, supra n. 27, at 117. 
 35. See id. at 126.  Beyond this minimal specification, “there is no explicit ‘numerosity’ requirement 
such as exists under U.S. Rule 23.”  Craig Jones, Theory of Class Actions at 119 (2003) (footnote 
omitted).  Nor need “the precise numbers or identities of the class members . . . be known before 
certification will be granted.”  Id. 
 36. See Mulheron, supra n. 27, at 128. 
 37. See infra Parts III-B-2 (predominance), V (issue classing). 
 38. See Edward F. Sherman, American Class Actions: Significant Features and Developing Alternatives 
in Foreign Legal Systems, 215 F.R.D. 130, 151 (2003). 
 39. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3). 
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commonality and adequacy of representation,40 and it is not on the books in a 
significant handful of states.  Illinois’ class-action statute requires numerosity, 
commonality, and adequacy, but omits any mention of typicality.41  Similarly, 
the UCAA and its adopting states of Iowa and North Dakota lack the typicality 
prerequisite.42 
The picture in the Field-Code states, and in North Carolina with its 
somewhat Code-like rule, is mixed.  The text of all these provisions makes no 
mention of typicality, but constructions vary considerably.  Case law in 
Nebraska and North Carolina follows federal practice in requiring typicality.43  
Wisconsin seems to be at the opposite extreme: its rule has been construed “‘to 
present only one set of criteria’—namely, commonality, adequate 
representation, and numerosity.”44  California appears to take an intermediate 
position, treating typicality as a factor to be considered without requiring it.45 
The Canadian provinces that have class actions, and the Australian 
federal courts, have no typicality requirement: the “typicality criterion in FRCP 
. . . has no equivalent in the regimes of the Canadian provinces.”46  “Typicality 
is not an express requirement” in the statutes of Ontario or Australia.47  
Atypicality, of course, might raise questions about the appropriateness of class 
proceedings or the adequacy of representation; but typicality is not a separate 
base that courts in these several jurisdictions need to touch. 
 
E. Adequacy of Representation 
 
In the United States, adequacy of representation is a fundamental 
federal constitutional requirement for federal and state class actions alike.48  
Federal Rule 23 and state rules and statutes also universally include the 
adequacy requirement in their text.  Application focuses on both lack of 
conflict between the putative representatives and the class, and the adequacy of 
the representation that putative class counsel will provide.  In federal practice a 
 
 40. See General Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 n. 13 (1982) (“The commonality and typicality 
requirements of Rule 23(a) tend to merge . . . Those requirements . . . also tend to merge with the 
adequacy-of-representation requirement.”). 
 41. See 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/2-801(1)-(3) (2003); Survey, supra n. 3, at 145 (“The Illinois statute does 
not have the typicality requirement of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).”). 
 42. See Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.261, 1.262(2) (requiring numerosity, commonality, “fair and efficient 
adjudication,” and adequacy); N.D. R. Civ. P. 23(a), (b)(2) (same). 
 43. See Survey, supra n. 3, at 304 (Neb.) (“the claims of the representative must be typical of the class”); 
id. at 352 (N.C.) (“The claims of the class representatives must be typical of the claims of the 
class.”). 
 44. See id. at 538. 
 45. See id. at 39; Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 67 Cal. 2d 695, 709 (1967) (footnote omitted) (“We . . . find 
of interest the [Federal Rule 23(a) prerequisites];” quoting prerequisites, including typicality, in 
footnote but not otherwise using “typical” or “typicality” in opinion). 
 46. Mulheron, supra n. 27, at 161. 
 47. Id. at 211. 
 48. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42-43 (1940) (“members of a class not present as parties to the 
litigation may be bound by the judgment where they are in fact adequately represented by parties 
who are present.”). 
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separate Rule 23(g), adopted in 2003 and as yet little followed in the states,49 
regulates the appointment of class counsel; under earlier federal practice and as 
far as I have seen in most states, the requirements for the representatives and 
for class counsel tend to be administered under the single adequacy 
prerequisite.50  A significant issue on which lower federal courts are divided 
and the Supreme Court has not yet ruled in federal practice is to what extent a 
finding of adequacy in a class action is preclusive against collateral attacks 
upon adequacy by later challengers who seek to litigate the underlying merits 
of a previously settled or litigated class action.51  State courts that have faced 
such issues appear to be divided as well, both between states and internally.52 
 
F. “Negative-Value” Class Actions 
 
South Carolina has a unique prerequisite that appears to bar “negative-
value” class actions aggregating large numbers of small monetary claims: “[I]n 
cases in which the relief primarily sought is not injunctive or declaratory with 
respect to the class as a whole, the amount in controversy [must] exceed[] one 
hundred dollars for each member of the class.”53  According to history of this 
provision, “It is intended to limit class actions when the amount sought may be 
small in comparison with the costs incurred in the litigation.”54  The provision 
reflects skepticism sometimes expressed about class actions that deliver 
relatively small recoveries to class members along with large fees to class 
counsel, but it also runs counter to one significant purpose of modern class 
actions—”to provide aggrieved persons a remedy when individual litigation is 
economically unrealistic.”55  It may also be undercut by two recent 
developments that might let such negative-value class actions be brought in 
federal court.  First, for cases that can qualify for general federal diversity 
jurisdiction, the Supreme Court held in 2005 that the supplemental-jurisdiction 
statute overrules a previous federal decisional requirement that all members of 
a class in most federal diversity class actions had to have jurisdictionally 
 
 49. I skimmed the current state provisions reproduced in Survey, supra n. 3, and found counterpart rules 
only in Minn., N.J., and Tex.  See id. at 272-273 (quoting Minn. R. Civ. P. 23.07); Survey, supra n. 
3, at 328 (quoting N.J. R. Civ. P. 4:32-2(g)); Survey, supra n. 3, at 498-499 (quoting Tex. R. Civ. P. 
42(g)). 
 50. On federal practice before the 2003 amendment, see e.g. Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 
239, 247 (3d Cir. 1975) (for Rule 23(a)(4) adequate representation, putative representatives must 
show lack of “interests antagonistic to other members of the class” and that “their attorney is capable 
of prosecuting the instant claim with some degree of expertise”). 
 51. See American Law Institute, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 3.14 Reporters’ 
Notes at 286-287 (Discussion Draft No. 2, 2007) (hereafter “PRINCIPLES”) (discussing division in 
federal case law and in commentary). 
 52. Compare e.g. Lamarque v. Fairbanks Capital Corp., 927 A.2d 753 (R.I. 2007) (majority favoring 
strong approach allowing preclusion, over dissent), with e.g. Wilkes ex rel. Mason v. Phoenix Home 
Life Mut. Ins. Co., 587 Pa. 590 (2006) (majority expressing doubt about broad preclusion, but with 
partial concurrence questioning majority’s view). 
 53. S.C.  R. Civ. P. 23(a)(5). 
 54. 2 Mullenix, supra n. 1, S.C. § 1.02, at 42,012. 
 55. 5 Moore’s, supra n. 28, § 23.03, at 23-35. 
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sufficient claims.56  Second, the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 authorizes 
federal jurisdiction over minimal-diversity class actions with at least 100 class 
members and aggregate damages exceeding $5,000,000.57 
 
III.  CLASS-ACTION TYPES AND MAINTAINABILITY 
 
Federal Rule 23(b) establishes basic types of class actions and includes 
criteria for maintaining actions of the various types.  In a broad sense two types 
exist—mandatory and opt-out.  Mandatory class actions, from which members 
cannot opt out, are class proceedings by necessity—under Rule 23(b)(1) when 
separate actions would create the risk of either (A) inconsistent adjudications 
establishing incompatible conduct standards for the class’s adversary or (B) 
practical effects on the interests of others not parties, and under Rule 23(b)(2) 
when injunctive or declaratory relief would be appropriate for the class as a 
whole.  Rule 23(b)(3) class actions, sometimes referred to as common-question 
actions, almost invariably involve pooling of individual damage claims; by 
rule, the unnamed members must be given an opportunity to withdraw from the 
class proceeding.  Here as elsewhere, a significant majority of the states track 
the federal phrasing verbatim; but some significant variants exist. 
 
A. (b)(1) and (b)(2) Types 
 
State variants on by-necessity class actions are few and appear less 
significant than those with common-question actions.  New Hampshire’s 
general class-action rule tracks Federal Rule 23(a)’s prerequisites and then adds 
Federal Rule 23(b)(3)’s superiority requirement58 plus a separate item on 
adequate representation of class interests by the representatives’ attorney,59 
yielding a six-factor list of prerequisites for what seems to be a single type of 
class action.  Neither New Hampshire Superior Court Rule 27-A(a), listing the 
six prerequisites, nor any other part of the basic state class-action rule, picks up 
on the federal action-by-necessity types.  Oddly, though, the state has a 
consumer class-action statute that tracks all the types in Federal Rule 23(b).60  
Under the general rule, other provisions like notice and opt-out apply to class 
actions generally,61 making it appear that as a practical matter New Hampshire 
 
 56. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc., 545 U.S. 546 (2005) (holding that 28 U.S.C. § 
1367 (2000) overrules holding in Zahn  v. Intl. Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973), that any unnamed 
class member in separate-claim diversity class action who does not satisfy jurisdictional-amount 
requirement individually must be dismissed). 
 57. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(d) (2), (5)(B), (6) (2006). 
 58. Compare Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) (requiring finding that “a class action is superior to other available 
methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy”) with N.H. Super. Ct. R. 27-A(a)(5) 
(identical phrasing to pre-2007 federal provision, same as 2007 federal provision except for using 
“the fair and efficient adjudication of”). 
 59. N.H. Super. Ct. R. 27-A(a)(6) (“the attorney for the representative parties will adequately represent 
the interests of the class.”). 
 60. See N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 358-A:10-a(II) (1995 & Supp. 2007). 
 61. See N.H. Super. Ct. R. 27-A(e). 
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lacks counterparts to the mandatory federal types except under the consumer 
statute.  South Carolina also lacks a counterpart to Federal Rule 23(b),62 but 
what I have not encountered in these two states or elsewhere is any apparent 
deliberate variations on the mandatory types.  Such variations do, though, 
appear in significant number when we turn to the federal 23(b)(3) type, 
particularly with respect to its predominance requirement. 
 
B. (b)(3) Types 
 
1.  Superiority   
 
Most states with modern-era class-action rules more or less track the 
federal requirement, for common-question actions, “that a class action [be] 
superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudication the 
controversy.”63  New Hampshire’s general rule, as we have seen, has 
superiority as a prerequisite but appears to have no real counterpart to the 
federal rule’s by-necessity actions.64  The one significant American variation I 
have found is that Illinois, which also omits the typicality prerequisite of 
Federal Rule 23(a)(3) and most state rules, adds as a fourth general prerequisite 
that the class action be “an appropriate method for the fair and efficient 
adjudication of the controversy.”65  This certification-friendly articulation is 
reinforced by judicial gloss that if “the first three prerequisites” of numerosity, 
commonality, and adequate representation are met, then it is “evident that the 
fourth requirement has been fulfilled.”66  Accordingly, “Illinois has become an 
attractive forum for those parties whose claims do not readily satisfy the federal 
rule’s superior means of adjudication requirement.”67 
Finally, in the three Canadian provinces of British Columbia, Ontario, 
and Quebec the parallel inquiry seems to be whether “a class proceeding 
[would] be the preferable procedure for the fair and efficient resolution of the 
common issues”68—which notably focuses not on fairness and efficiency in 
“adjudicating the controversy” as a whole as does the American federal rule.  
The Canadian focus on fairness and efficiency in resolving the common issues 
 
 62. See Survey, supra n. 3, at 454 (“Conspicuously lacking from the state rule . . . is the language 
contained in Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b).”)  As a result South Carolina appears to offset its provision ruling 
out small-claim class actions, see supra text accompanying notes 53-54, with the at least theoretical 
possibility of a common-question damage class action not satisfying the predominance or superiority 
requirements of Federal Rule 23(b)(3).  See Survey, supra n. 3, at 455-456 (discussing limited and 
somewhat inconsistent case law on appropriateness of class actions under South Carolina rule).  The 
lack of a counterpart to Federal Rule 23(b) does mean that South Carolina has no textual provision 
for mandatory class actions.  Such actions also appear to be unknown in Canada.  See Jones, supra n. 
35, at 126 (“there has never been a ‘mandatory’ class certified in Canada”). 
 63. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). 
 64. See supra text accompanying note 60. 
 65. 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/2-801(4) (2003). 
 66. Clark v. TAP Pharm. Products, Inc., 343 Ill. App. 3d 508, 552 (2003). 
 67. 1 Mullenix, supra n. 1, Ill. § 1.03(C)(2), at 15,014 (footnote omitted). 
 68. Jones, supra n. 35, at 120. 
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seems friendlier toward maintenance of actions in class form.  Indeed, “the 
preferability of a class action is largely determined by whether there are 
sufficient common issues.”69 
 
2.  Predominance  
 
To begin with, a few states’ rules or statutes treat predominance as one 
factor in a multi-factor list rather than something that a court must find.  That is 
true in the Uniform Class Action Act states of Iowa70 and North Dakota,71 and 
also in Oregon72 and Pennsylvania73 with their provisions that do not track the 
federal rule in cookie-cutter fashion.  In the many state systems with a 
predominance requirement like that of Federal Rule 23(b)(3),74 a first point of 
note is that state courts do give it a good deal of attention.75  Interpretations, 
though, appear to vary considerably—from strictness like that seen in some 
federal decisions76 to considerable liberality.77  And, as will appear in 
consideration of issue classing,78 it can be vital whether an applicable 
predominance requirement holds for the litigation as a whole or can focus on 
individual issues.  Ontario and British Columbia also appear somewhat liberal 
in this regard; courts may not refuse to certify a class solely “because damages 
require individual assessment.”79 
 
C. Individual Viability and “Costs and Burdens” Factors, and Settlement-
Class Type, in Louisiana 
 
Three apparently unique provisions in Louisiana’s class-action statute 
 
 69. Id. at 123. 
 70. See Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.263(1) (predominance as fifth criterion in thirteen-factor list). 
 71. See N.D. R. Civ. P. 23(c) (1) (same). 
 72. See Or. R. Civ. P. 32B (predominance as one of eight matters relevant to required finding of 
superiority). 
 73. See Pa. R. Civ. P. 1708(a) (predominance as first of seven criteria relevant to required determination 
“whether a class action is a fair and efficient method of adjudicating the controversy” in money-relief 
cases). 
 74. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) (court needs to find “that the questions of law or fact common to class 
members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members”). 
 75. The Mullenix treatise takes up predominance in § 5.03 of each of its state chapters, and most that I 
looked at in a spot check had at least some, and often considerable, discussion of state decisions on 
the predominance requirement.  See Mullenix, supra n. 1, § 5.03, passim. 
 76. See e.g. 1 Mullenix, supra n. 1. Del. § 5.03, at 9045 (footnote omitted) (“common law fraud claims 
cannot be brought as Rule 23(b)(3) classes . . . Also, individual causation issues predominate over 
common issues in nondisclosure mass tort cases (multiple-event disasters as opposed to single 
incident).”). 
 77. See e.g. 1 Mullenix supra n. 1 id. Ark. § 5.03, at 5031 (footnote omitted) (“The predominance 
element can be satisfied if preliminary common issues can be resolved before the individual 
issues.”); 1 id. Conn. § 5.03, at 8030 (footnote omitted) (“that individual class members have 
differing monetary claims will not defeat the predominance requirement”); 2 id. Ohio § 5.03, at 
37,052 (Ohio “courts have granted certification for” “mass tort claims and mass accidents”). 
 78. See infra Part V. 
 79. Jones, supra n. 35, at 120. 
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derive from proposed, but unadopted, revisions to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure in the late 1990s.80  First, the state adds the following two factors to 
Federal Rule 23(b)’s four-factor list of matters pertinent to the required 
findings of predominance and superiority for a (b)(3) class action: 
(e)  The practical ability of individual class members to pursue their 
claims without class certification; 
(f)  The extent to which the relief plausibly demanded on behalf of or 
against the class, including the vindication of such public policies or legal 
rights as may be implicated, justifies the costs and burdens of class litigation;81 
Second, Louisiana allows a fourth type of class for situations in which 
parties seek certification for settlement purposes but might not be able to gain 
certification of a common-question class for all purposes: 
(4) The parties to a settlement request certification under Subparagraph 
B(3) for purposes of settlement, even though the requirements of Subparagraph 
B(3) might not otherwise be met.82 
The “costs and burdens” provision has apparently not led to a refusal to 
certify “negative-value” class actions involving aggregations of small 
individual claims.83  As for the (b)(4) type, while as yet little used it seems 
likely to make the settlement-class approach relatively easy to use in Louisiana 
state court, perhaps more so than in federal court;84 it also appears, though, that 
in deciding whether to certify for settlement-class purposes, Louisiana state 
courts are not to look ahead to the likely fairness of a proposed settlement.85 
 
D. Merits as Certification Factor 
 
A fixture of American federal class-action practice is the that the 
apparent strength or weakness of a class’s claim or defense on the substantive 
merits is supposed to have no bearing on a court’s procedural decision whether 
or not to certify a class action.86  Whatever the extent to which this rule may 
just drive the likely merit of a class claim underground in trial judges’ 
certification decisions rather than submerging it entirely, the states addressing 
 
 80. See Report of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules 37 (May 17, 1996), accessible at 
 http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/CV5-1996.pdf (accessed Dec. 12, 2007). 
 81. La. Code Civ. P. Ann. art. 591(B)(3)(e)-(f) (1999). 
 82. Id. art. 591(B)(4).  The need for such a provision in Federal Rule 23 appears to be at least reduced by 
the Supreme Court’s disapproval in Amchem Prods. Inc., v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 619 (1997) of a 
requirement that class actions proposed for purposes of settlement only had to be certifiable for trial 
as well:  “The Third Circuit's opinion stated that each of the requirements of Rule 23(a) and (b)(3) 
‘must be satisfied without taking into account the settlement’ . . . Settlement is relevant to a class 
certification. The Third Circuit's opinion bears modification in that respect.” 
 83. See Survey, supra note 3, at 200 (class actions are even “favored when the involve vindication of the 
rights of persons with negative value lawsuits”). 
 84. See id. at 201. 
 85. See 1 Mullenix, supra n. 1, La. § 3.03(E), at 20,030. 
 86. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 174 (1974) (“We find nothing in the language or 
history of Rule 23 that gives a court any authority to conduct a preliminary inquiry into the merits of 
a suit in order to determine whether it may be maintained as a class action.”). 
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the role of the likely merits in class certification follow the federal exclusion 
rule with virtual unanimity.87  Australian and Canadian class-action also “are 
unanimous in their views—none of them expressly permits the merits of the 
claim, the probability of its success, to be considered at the commencement 
stage of class litigation.”88 
Such exceptions as I have found are extremely limited or tentative at 
best.  Indeed, Oregon has eliminated a former provision that required courts to 
consider “whether the plaintiffs’ chances of prevailing were so minimal as to 
preclude proceeding as a class action.”89  California has refused to rule out a 
court’s denying class certification for lack of substantive merit as a matter of 
law “in the exceptional case where the defense has no other reasonable pretrial 
means to challenge the merits of a claim to be asserted by a proposed class.”90  
The relevance of likely substantive merit appears somewhat unclear in 
Colorado.91  On the whole, though, the rejection of apparent substantive merit 
or lack thereof as a certification factor appears widely entrenched. 
 
IV.  MERITS MOTIONS BEFORE CERTIFICATION? 
 
Federal practice before late 2003 had been not entirely settled on 
whether, in cases with class certification sought, courts could act on dispositive 
motions to dismiss or for summary judgment before ruling on certification.  
The language of then-effective Federal Rule 23(c)(1), requiring a ruling on 
certification “as soon as practicable,”92 had led to some division over whether 
courts could enter judgment on a non-class basis without ever ruling on class 
certification.93  The seemingly minor change to the current federal rule’s “at an 
early practicable time”94 in 2003 was intended to end uncertainty by 
recognizing, among other things, the legitimacy of ruling on dispositive 
motions before deciding whether to certify.95 
 
 87. See e.g. Mullenix, supra n. 1, Ark. § 3.03(B), at 5021; Id. Del. § 3.03(B), at 9026; Id. La. § 3.03(B), 
at 20,030.  See generally id. §§ 3.03(B), passim. 
 88. Mulheron, supra n. 27, at 134.  See generally id. 130-136 (discussing issue including arguments for 
contrary approaches and suspicions of possible covert or semi-covert role of likely merits in 
certification rulings despite their supposed irrelevance). 
 89. 2 Mullenix, supra n. 1, Or. § 3.03(B), at 39,022. 
 90. 1 id. Cal. § 3/03(B), at 6040-41.  California also allows consideration of the merits to the extent that 
they bear on procedural certification issues such as commonality and predominance, see id. 6040, but 
that is different from letting likely substantive merit or lack thereof enter into the decision whether to 
certify. 
 91. See 1 id. Colo. § 3/03(B), at 7020. 
 92. See 5 Moore’s, supra n. 28, § 23.81[1], at 23-374 (3d ed. 2007). 
 93. See Richard L. Marcus & Edward F. Sherman, Complex Civil Litigation: Cases & Materials on 
Advanced Civil Procedure at 368-369 (4th ed. 2004) (describing evolution in judicial thinking about 
merits rulings before certification under pre-2003 language).  
 94. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(A). 
 95. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(A) advisory committee’s note to 2003 amendment: 
Other considerations [than gathering information needed to decide whether to 
certify] may affect the timing of the certification decision.  The party opposing 
the class may prefer to win dismissal or summary judgment as to the individual 
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State practice, often under the “as soon as practicable” language, shows 
some variation but with a majority of states facing the issue seeming to allow 
rulings on dispositive motions before decisions on certification.96  Apparent 
exceptions, at least to some extent, include Georgia,97 Minnesota,98 and North 
Carolina.99 
 
V.  ISSUE CLASSING 
 
The federal Courts of Appeals are sharply split on the interrelation 
between the predominance requirement of Federal Rule 23(b)(3)100 and the 
issue-classing authorization of subdivision (c)(4) of the same rule.101  The Fifth 
Circuit forbids use of issue classing as a way of avoiding problems with finding 
predominance as to a claim as a whole: a “district court cannot manufacture 
predominance through nimble use” of issue classing.  “The proper 
interpretation of the interaction between subdivisions (b)(3) and (c)(4) is that a 
cause of action, as a whole, must satisfy the predominance requirement of 
(b)(3) and that (c)(4) is a housekeeping rule that allows courts to sever the 
common issues for a class trial.”102  The Second Circuit flatly disagrees, 
rejecting the Fifth Circuit’s view and holding that “a district court may certify a 
class as to specific issues regardless of whether the entire claim satisfies Rule 
23(b)(3).”103 
 
plaintiffs without certification and without binding the class that might have been 
certified. 
 96. Author’s impression formed from review of § 3.03(A) in every chapter of Mullenix, supra n. 1, 
yielding negative or mostly negative answers in only three out of 28 states plus District of Columbia 
listed as having dealt with issue (although some show treatment only at lower-court level). 
 97. See Sta-Power Indus., Inc. v. Avant, 134 Ga. App. 952, 954 (1975) (“the first issue to be resolved is 
not whether the plaintiffs have stated a cause of action or may ultimately prevail on the merits but 
whether the [statutory] requirements . . . have been met”).  “This rule is not absolute, however, and in 
some cases Georgia courts will address the merits first.”  Survey, supra n. 3, at 118. 
 98. 1 Mullenix, supra n. 1, Minn. § 3.03(A), at 25,030 (footnote omitted): 
As a general rule, Minnesota courts consider the issue of class certification 
before a case is decided on the merits.  However, when the merits of the 
litigation involve the judicial interpretation of a controlling state statute fully 
determinable as a matter of law, this general rule does not apply. 
 99. 2 id. N.C. § 3.03(A), at 35,018 (footnotes omitted): 
Generally, trial courts should not consider a dispositive motion before ruling on a 
motion for class certification.  This general rule applies with particular force 
when the motion for class certification is filed contemporaneously with the filing 
of the complaint. 
 100. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) (for common-question class action, court must inter alia find “that the 
questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only 
individual members”). 
 101. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4) (“When appropriate, an action may be brought or maintained as a class 
action with respect to particular issues.”). 
 102. Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 745 n. 21 (5th Cir. 1996). 
 103. In re Nassau Co. Strip Search Cases, 460 F.3d 219, 226 (2d Cir. 2006) (initial capitalization 
removed).  See also Valentino v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 97 F.3d 1227, 1234 (9th Cir. 1996) “Even if 
the common questions do not predominate over the individual questions so that class certification of 
the entire action is warranted, Rule 23 authorizes the district court in appropriate cases to isolate the 
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Many states have the federal combination of a predominance 
requirement and an authorization for issue classing,104 but a relatively small 
number seem to have addressed the sort of issue that divides the federal 
circuits.  Most of these few have taken liberal approaches more or less along 
the lines of the Second Circuit’s view.  Texas, for example, permits 
certification as to some issues while it is denied as to others, and does not 
require that the issue certified for class treatment be dispositive of the 
litigation.105  Other states taking apparently liberal approaches include 
Connecticut, where “partial class actions” call for reading certification 
requirements “to refer only to those issues for which the court has granted 
certification”;106 Minnesota, where “predominance of a common issue of 
liability over individual questions of damage has been frequently 
recognized”;107 and New Jersey, where the “trial court may certify a class based 
on limited issues without certifying all common claims for adjudication.”108 
The only possible exception found is Illinois, where “some courts have 
refused to allow plaintiffs to utilize a limited issue class in order to satisfy the 
requirement th[at] common questions predominate.”109  The permissibility of 
issue-class certification when common questions do not predominate as to a 
class action as a whole seems best resolved on policy rather than interpretive 
grounds.110  Yet the phrasing of many states’ rules may force their courts, like 
the federal ones, into interpretive arguments unless the rules’ text is amended. 
 
VI.  NOTICE AND OPT-OUT 
 
A. Variations on Individual-Notice Requirement 
 
A prominent feature of Federal Rule 23 is its requirement that for (b)(3) 
common-question class actions, “the court must direct to class members the 
best notice that is practicable under the circumstances, including individual 
notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort.”111  The 
 
common issues under [Rule 23(c)(4)] and proceed with class treatment of these particular issues.”). 
 104. Massachusetts appears to be the only state with a predominance requirement and no authorization for 
issue classes.  See Mass. R. Civ. P. 23(c) (predominance requirement); Fletcher v. Cape Cod Gas 
Co., 394 Mass. 595, 602 (1985) (omission of limited-issue provision from Massachusetts rule reflects 
choice not to have limited-issue class actions available).  States that treat predominance as a factor 
rather than a requirement seem not to have to rely on their issue-classing authority to find a way to 
certifying a class action.  See generally supra Part III-B-2. 
 105. See 2 Mullenix, supra n. 1, Tex. § 5.05, at 45,097. 
 106. 1 id. Conn. § 5.05, at 8032. 
 107. 1 id. Minn. § 5.05, at 25,056 (footnote omitted). 
 108. 2 id. N.J. § 5.05, at 32, 051 (footnote omitted). 
 109. 1 id. Ill. § 5.05, at 15, 048 (footnote omitted). 
 110. See PRINCIPLES, supra n. 51, § 2.03(a) (“Courts . . . should consider whether the aggregate treatment 
of common issues will materially advance the disposition of multiple civil claims by comparison to 
other realistic procedural alternatives.”); Id. Reporters’ Note to cmt. B (discussing factors bearing on 
aggregation decisions). 
 111. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B). 
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rule has been interpreted strictly,112  and class actions in many states are 
governed by identical language.  On this point, however, one finds the single 
largest number of variations from federal practice.  All are in the direction of 
less stringent requirements, which seems to reflect a fairly widespread sense 
that the Federal Rule’s text—despite due-process concerns in the 
background113—does not coincide with a constitutional mandate. 
The two most common types of variation are express judicial discretion 
as to the notice to be provided and the enumeration of lists of factors to be 
balanced in deciding on notice—which amounts to a form of guided discretion.  
Illinois,114 Maryland,115 Pennsylvania,116 and South Carolina117 in one way or 
another all expressly confer discretion on trial judges.  California,118 Iowa,119 
 
 112. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 176 (1974) (“individual notice to identifiable class 
members is not a discretionary consideration to be waived in a particular case. It is, rather, an 
unambiguous requirement of Rule 23.”). 
 113. See id. at 174 (quoting advisory committee note to 1966 revision) (“the ‘mandatory notice pursuant 
to subdivision (c)(2) . . . is designed to fulfill requirements of due process to which the class action 
procedure is of course subject.”). 
 114. See 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/2-803 (2003) (“the court in its discretion may order such notice that it 
deems necessary to protect the interests of the class and the parties”). 
 115. See Md. R. Civ. P. 2-231(e) (“In a class action maintained under subsection (b)(3), notice shall be 
given to members of the class in the manner the court directs.”). 
 116. See Pa. R. Civ. P. 1712(b): 
(b) The court may require individual notice to be given by personal service or by 
mail to all members who can be identified with reasonable effort.  For members 
of the class who cannot be identified with reasonable effort or where the court 
has not required individual notice, the court shall require notice to be given 
through methods reasonably calculated to inform the members of the class of the 
pendency of the action.  Such methods may include using a newspaper, television 
or radio or posting or distributing through a trade, union or public interest group. 
 Pennsylvania also provides factors to guide judicial discretion.  See Pa. R. Civ. P. 1712(a): 
(a) In determining the type and content of notice to be used and the members to 
be notified, the court shall consider the extent and nature of the class, the relief 
requested, the cost of notifying the members and the possible prejudice to be 
suffered by members of the class or by other parties if notice is not received.  
 117. See S.C. R. Civ. P. 23(d)(2) (“The court . . . may order that notice be given in such a manner as it 
may direct of the pendency of the action by the party seeking to maintain the action on behalf of the 
class.”). 
 118. See Cal. R. Ct. 3.766(e): 
In determining the manner of the notice, the court must consider: 
(1) The interests of the class; 
(2) The type of relief requested; 
(3) The stake of the individual class members; 
(4) The cost of notifying class members; 
(5) The resources of the parties; 
(6) The possible prejudice to class members who do not receive notice; and 
(7) The res judicata effect on class members. 
See Cal. R. Ct. 3.766(f): 
(f)If personal notification is unreasonably expensive or the stake of individual 
class members is insubstantial, or if it appears that all members of the class 
cannot be notified personally, the court may order a means of notice reasonably 
calculated to apprise the class members of the pendency of the action-for 
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New York,120 North Dakota,121 and Pennsylvania122 list factors to guide 
discretion.  The Uniform Class Action Act states of Iowa and North Dakota add 
provision to protect class members with non-trivial claims or against whom 
such claims are made.  In the words of the North Dakota version: 
Each member of the class, not a representative party, whose potential 
monetary recovery or liability is estimated to exceed $100 must be given 
personal notice, mailed notice, or notice via third-party commercial carrier if 
the person’s identity and whereabouts can be ascertained by the exercise of 
reasonable diligence.123 
Oklahoma tempers its notice requirement, which tracks the federal 
language, with an exception for cases involving more than 500 class members 
identifiable with reasonable effort.124  New Jersey punts on any constitutional 
issues by requiring for (b)(3) actions “the best notice practicable under the 
circumstances, consistent with due process of law.”125  And 
Canadian class proceedings legislation is remarkably flexible on the 
question of notice.  While setting out the factors which the court must consider 
 
example, publication in a newspaper or magazine; broadcasting on television, 
radio, or the Internet; or posting or distribution through a trade or professional 
association, union, or public interest group. 
 119. See Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.266(3) (“In determining the manner and form of the notice to be given, the 
court shall consider the interests of the class, the relief requested, the cost of notifying the members 
of the class,  and the possible prejudice to members who do not receive notice.”). 
 120. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 904(c) (McKinney 2006): 
In determining the method by which notice is to be given, the court shall 
consider 
1. the cost of giving notice by each method considered 
2. the resources of the parties and 
3. the stake of each represented member of the class, and the likelihood that 
significant numbers of represented members would desire to exclude themselves 
from the class or to appear individually, which may be determined, in the court's 
discretion, by sending notice to a random sample of the class. 
 121. See N.D. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(3) (“In determining the manner and form of the notice to be given, the 
court shall consider the interests of the class, the relief requested, the cost of notifying members of 
the class, and the possible prejudice to members who do not receive notice.”). 
 122. See supra n. 116. 
 123. N.D. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(4).  The Iowa version omits the third-party carrier aspect but is otherwise 
essentially the same.  See Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.266(4); 
 124. See Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 2023(C)(2) (West 1993): 
Where the class contains more than five hundred (500) members who can be 
identified through reasonable effort, it shall not be necessary to direct individual 
notice to more than five hundred (500) members, but the members to whom 
individual notice is not directed shall be given notice in such manner as the court 
shall direct, which may include publishing notice in newspapers, magazines, 
trade journals or other publications, posting it in appropriate places, and taking 
other steps that are reasonably calculated to bring the notice to the attention of 
such members, provided that the cost of giving such notice shall be reasonable in 
view of the amounts that may be recovered by the class members who are being 
notified.  Members to whom individual notice was not directed may request 
exclusion from the class at any time before the issue of liability is determined, 
and commencing an individual action before the issue of liability is determined 
shall be the equivalent of requesting exclusion from the class. 
 125. N.J. R. Civ. P. 4:32-2(b)(2). 
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when determining what notice is required in the circumstances, Ontario and 
B.C. also allow that the court “may dispense with notice if . . . the court 
considers it appropriate to do so.”126 
In short, federal and state rulemakers seeking models for modified 
notice provisions have no shortage of sources—and perhaps, with further 
research, experience in how well the several variations seem to work. 
 
B. Costs of Notice 
 
Along with its no-exceptions interpretation of the notice provision, the 
Supreme Court has also held that Federal Rule 23 as now phrased does not 
permit federal courts to require defendants to front any of the costs of giving 
notice.127  In some states and the District of Columbia,128 though, courts may 
require defendants to bear the cost of notice; the states include New Jersey129 
and New York.130  In California131 and Colorado,132 a court may require the 
class’s adversary to provide notice.  And in Pennsylvania, a court may require a 
defendant to cooperate in minimizing plaintiff’s notice expenses133—a power 
that some other courts may well feel they have even without explicit rule 
authorization.134 
 
C. Advance Notice to Putative Defendant 
 
 126. Jones, supra n. 35, at 126. 
 127. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177 (1974) (“petitioner must bear the cost of notice 
to the members of his class”). 
 128. See D.C. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2) (“The cost of notice shall be paid by the plaintiff unless the Court . . . 
concludes (1) that the plaintiff class will more likely than not prevail on the merits and (2) that it is 
necessary to require the defendant to pay some or all of that cost in order to prevent manifest 
injustice.”). 
 129. See N.J. R. Civ. P. 4:32-2(b)(3) (“The cost of notice may be assessed against any party present before 
the court, or may be allocated among present before the court, pending final disposition of the 
cause.”). 
 130. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 904(d)(1) (McKinney 2006) (plaintiff to bear notice costs unless court orders 
otherwise, but court “may, if justice requires, require that the defendant bear the expense of 
notification, or may requite each of [the parties] to bear a part of the expense in proportion to the 
likelihood that each will prevail upon the merits”). 
 131. See Cal. R. Ct. 3.766(a) (“If the class is certified, the court may require either party to notify the class 
of the action in the manner specified by the court.”). 
 132. See Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. District Court, 778 P.2d 667, 673 (Colo. 1989) (although 
usual rule is for representative plaintiff to bear notice costs, in some cases “it is appropriate to relieve 
the plaintiff of the burden of such costs and to require the defendant to perform the task of sending 
the class notices to class members”). 
 133. See Pa. R. Civ. P. 1712(c): 
The court may require a defendant to cooperate in giving notice by taking steps 
which will minimize the plaintiff's expense including the use of the defendant's 
established methods of communication with members of the class, provided, 
however, that any additional costs thereby incurred by the defendant shall be 
paid by the plaintiff. 
 134. Cf. Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 355 (1978) (footnote omitted) (Rule 23(d) 
“authorizes a district court in appropriate circumstances to require defendant’s cooperation in 
identifying the class members to whom notice must be sent”). 
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Oregon has an apparently unique notice provision dealing not with 
notice to class members but with notice to a putative damage class-action 
defendant.  First, the potential class representative must give the intended 
defendant thirty days’ notice of the claim with a demand for correcting the 
alleged wrong.135  Then the class action may not go forward if the defendant 
shows that it has identified, or made reasonable efforts to identify, the class 
members; has notified them that on request it will rectify the alleged wrong; 
has done so or will within a reasonable time; and that it has ceased the 
allegedly wrongful conduct (or, in case of impossibility or unreasonable 
expense of immediate cessation, will cease within a reasonable time).136  This 
ingeniously framed measure is apparently intended to avoid unnecessary 
litigation when a defendant is willing to deal in full with an alleged wrong 
suffered by many; but the lack of reported cases in its multi-decade existence 
makes it questionable whether the mechanism has significant effect.137 
 
D. Opt-Out and Opt-In Variations 
 
1.  Opt-outs   
 
The basic federal opt-out approach for damage class actions, requiring 
that notice in (b)(3) class actions include information of members’ right to opt 
out,138 is widely followed in the states.  Variations seem to be few, with 
Massachusetts’ general class-action rule uniquely lacking any mandatory notice 
provision or authorization for opting out.  All class-action notice in 
Massachusetts is discretionary with the trial judge, and due-process protection 
comes mainly from adequacy of representation rather than notice.139  These 
choices, even if they improve the flexibility of the state rule, have the 
consequence that Massachusetts does not meet federal due-process 
requirements for multistate actions with binding effect on out-of-state members 
of damage class actions.140  The only other variations found on opt-out 
approaches involve the rare defendant class action.  Under the phrasing of the 
federal and many state rules, the opt-out right seems to extend to members of 
defendant classes in damage actions, which could greatly reduce the 
 
 135. See Or. R. Civ. P. 32H. 
 136. See Or. R. Civ. P. 32I. 
 137. See Survey, supra n. 3, at 410-411 (reporting lack of published case law).  It could be that successful 
use of the notice-and-remedy mechanism has resulted in no reported decisions; it would take a 
dispute about some aspect of its use to produce litigation. 
 138. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B) (“The notice must clearly and concisely state in plain, easily 
understood language . . . (v) that the court will exclude from the class any member who requests 
exclusion”). 
 139. See 1 Mullenix, supra n. 1, Mass. § 7.05, at 23,051. 
 140. See Survey, supra n. 3, at 240-241; Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811-812 (1985) 
(due process requires that for valid interstate class action in state court, plaintiff class members 
without minimum contacts with foreign state receive notice with opportunities to be heard or opt 
out). 
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effectiveness of such actions.  The Uniform Class Action Act states of Iowa 
and North Dakota respond by forbidding opt-outs from defendant classes,141 
which might raise due-process questions. 
 
2.  Opt-in approaches   
 
The reverse approach of having unnamed class members opt in rather 
than regarding them as in and bound unless they opt out is possible and has 
received some discussion in connection with possible federal rule revisions.  
The idea did, though, raise controversy for possibly reducing the effectiveness 
of the class device, and was not pursued.142  On both federal and state levels it 
is little used, with federal use limited to the context of the Fair Labor Standards 
and Age Discrimination in Employment Acts.143  Pennsylvania allows its courts 
to switch from opt-out to opt-in on a finding that class members’ individual 
claims are substantial enough that they may be able to litigate on their own or 
that other special circumstances exist.144  British Columbia deals with the Shutts 
problem of binding effect on non-forum class members in multijurisdictional 
class actions145 by applying an opt-out approach for B.C. residents and 
requiring those from elsewhere to opt in if they wish to be included.146  The 
English group litigation regime, the counterpart to class actions there, works 
entirely on an opt-in basis.147  This still relatively new approach, on the books 
since 2000,148 may not be working particularly well149 but may result partly 
from problems other than its opt-in approach.150  In this area unlike some 
others, it appears that opt-in approaches on the books in legal contexts similar 
to ours may be few enough to provide little by way of models or useful 
 
 141. See Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.267(4) (“A member of a defendant class may not elect to be excluded.”); N.D. 
R. Civ. P. 23(h)(4) (same). 
 142. See generally Deborah R. Hensler & Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Beyond It Just Ain’t Worth It:  
Alternative Strategies for Damage Class Action Reform, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 137, 144-147 
(Spring/Summer 2001) (discussing and critiquing opt-in proposal). 
 143. See 29 U.S.C. §216(b) (2000) (Fair Labor Standards Act) (“No employee shall be a party plaintiff to 
any [FLSA] action [for unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime wages] unless he gives his 
consent in writing to become such a party and such consent is filed in the court in which such action 
is brought.”); 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (Age Discrimination in Employment Act) (incorporating FLSA 
procedure by reference).  The Second Circuit rejected a similar approach in a Federal Rule 23 action 
for plaintiff class members whom a district court allowed to opt into American litigation arising from 
a ski-train fire in Austria, if they waived their right to sue in Austria (where they could have 
relitigated an American judgment).  See Kern v. Siemens Corp., 393 F.3d 120, 124-129 (2d Cir. 
2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 1034 (2005). 
 144. See Pa. R. Civ. P. 1711(b). 
 145. See supra n. 140. 
 146. See Jones, supra n. 35, at 118; Mulheron, supra n. 27, at 31 n. 47 
 147. See Mulheron, supra n. 27, at 99.  So, apparently, does the regime in the Australian state of Victoria, 
which requires written consent from class members.  See Sherman, supra n. 38, at 152. 
 148. See Mulheron, supra n. 27, at 94. 
 149. See id. at 99 (suspicion “that the English multi-party schemas . . . are still too faint-hearted to permit 
recovery of damages for an unknown mass of  plaintiffs appears true, given the opt-in requirement”). 
 150. See id. 
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experience. 
 
3.  Second opt-out in connection with damage settlement   
 
Since 2003, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e)(4)—as yet little if at 
all followed in state rules—has allowed federal courts to condition settlement 
approval on a second opt-out chance for class members who had and did not 
exercise that opportunity after class certification but when no settlement had 
been reached: 
If the class action was previously certified under Rule 23(b)(3), the 
court may refuse to approve a settlement unless it affords a new opportunity to 
request exclusion to individual class members who had an earlier opportunity 
to request exclusion but did not do so.151 
Limited experience to date indicates that federal courts have rarely 
allowed such a second opt-out,152 at least in considerable part because both 
sides in settlement approval have incentives to argue against it.153  This pattern 
has led the current American Law Institute project on Principles of Aggregate 
Litigation to propose a strong presumption in favor of a second opt-out,154 and 
Texas makes the second opt-out not just presumptive but mandatory.155  The 
idea in some form seems to be gaining adherents; empiricists can only hope for 
enough adoptions of the various possible forms to provide some experience in 
which variety may work best.156 
 
VII.  OTHER FEATURES 
 
State class-action rules and statutes are too numerous and far too 
multifaceted for this survey to attempt anything close to exhaustiveness.  
 
 151. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(4). 
 152. See PRINCIPLES, supra n. 51, § 3.11 cmt. a (“the rule has not had a substantial impact.  It applies only 
as a matter of discretion, and few courts have ordered a second opt-out.”). 
 153. Class counsel may receive smaller amounts for fees if members opt out, and the settlement may even 
come apart.  “[N]either class counsel nor defense counsel wants to urge a procedure—not mandated 
by law—that may undo the settlement (especially when, as is common, the settlement gives the 
defendant the right to abandon the agreement if more than a specified number of class members opt 
out).”  Id. 
 154. See id. § 3.11: 
In any class action in which the terms of a settlement are not revealed until after 
the initial period for opting out has expired, class members should ordinarily 
have the right to opt out after the dissemination of notice of the proposed 
settlement.  If the court chooses not to grant a second opt-out right, it must make 
a written finding that compelling reasons exist for refusing to grant a second opt-
out. 
 155. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 42(e)(3) (“In an action previously certified as a class action under Rule 42(b)(3), 
the court may not approve a settlement unless it affords a new opportunity to request exclusion to 
individual class members who had an earlier opportunity to request exclusion but did not do so.”). 
156 See also Jones, supra n. 35, at 126-128 (in connection with aggregate assessment of damages on  
      statistical basis, which is permissible in Canada but constitutionally questionable in the United States,    
      British Columbia courts may allow or refuse to permit withdrawal from averaged assessments). 
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Discussion to this point has covered several of the most important aspects that 
are treated in Federal Rule 23 and key contrasting state and foreign variants.  
This Part will deal with some remaining features of class-action practice with 
which the federal rule does not deal directly but that some state rules address: 
counterclaims against class members, discovery, offers of judgment, and relief. 
 
A. Counterclaims Against Class Members 
 
Lack of provision in Federal Rule 23 for handling of counterclaims 
against class members leaves defendants’ efforts to bring such claims for 
treatment under Federal Rule 13 and decisional law, to deal with both 
legitimate efforts to bring claims that defendants may have against class 
members and such problems as possible abusive tactics trying to drive class 
members to opt out in large numbers.157  The Uniform Class Action Act 
provides one model of an approach to express treatment of the area for 
rulemakers who might wish to consider making explicit provision for 
counterclaims in the class-action context.  The UCAA draws lines between 
counterclaims against the plaintiff class as a whole or a subclass, which the 
defendant may plead if the court certifies those counterclaims as a class action, 
and claims against individual class members, which require leave of court.158  A 
parallel provision governs counterclaims by a defendant class or members 
thereof,159 and potential counterclaims in class actions are shielded against the 
preclusive effect commonly applied to omitted compulsory counterclaims in 
non-class actions.160 
 
B. Discovery 
 
Discovery from unnamed class members, like counterclaims against 
them, poses problems of potential abuse and harassment while sometimes 
reflecting legitimate need on such issues as class cohesion for purposes of 
litigating certification.161  The UCAA states of Iowa and North Dakota require 
leave of court for discovery against absent class members and provide a list of 
factors to guide judges’ decisions on such requests.162  California allows 
 
 157. See e.g. Donson Stores, Inc. v. Am. Bakeries Co., 58 F.R.D. 485, 489 (S.D. N.Y. 1973) (noting 
possible tactical abuse). 
 158. See Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.270(1): N.D. R. Civ. P. 23(k)(1). 
 159. See Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.270(4): N.D. R. Civ. P. 23(k)(4). 
 160. See Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.270(6): N.D. R. Civ. P. 23(k)(6). 
 161. See generally 7B Charles Alan Wright et al., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1796.1 (3d ed. 
2005) (discussing issues involving discovery in class actions). 
 162. See Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.269(1): N.D. R. Civ. P. 23(j)(1): 
Discovery [under applicable discovery rules {present in North Dakota rule; 
absent in Iowa rule}] may be used only on order of the court against a member of 
the class who is not a representative party or who has not appeared.  In deciding 
whether discovery should be allowed the court shall consider, among other 
relevant factors, the timing of the request, the subject matter to be covered, 
whether representatives of the class are seeking discovery on the subject to be 
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depositions via subpoenas to unnamed class members with the burden on them 
to seek protective orders, while allowing interrogatories to such members only 
with leave of court; it provides a single list of criteria similar to those in UCAA 
states for court decisions on discovery issues in both contexts.163  Maryland and 
Texas, finally, exclude unnamed class members from those viewed as “parties” 
for discovery purposes, with Maryland requiring motion for discovery against a 
class member other than a representative164 and Texas apparently relegating the 
class’s opponents to whatever discovery devices and procedures may be 
available against nonparties.165  Here, it seems that the lack of treatment in the 
Federal Rule may have contributed to somewhat disparate treatment in the 
states—which need not, of course, be a bad thing. 
 
C. Offers of Judgment 
 
Offer-of-judgment or offer-of-settlement rules, like Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 68 and parallel state rules, provide for formal offers with teeth: 
the offeror, always or often a defending party, may offer to have judgment 
entered against it in a certain amount, with adverse consequences such as 
liability for post-offer costs of the offeror if the offeree does not accept and 
does not do better than the offer at trial.166  The relationship between formal 
offer rules and class actions is troubled, because offer rules presume autonomy 
on the part of offerees in deciding whether to accept, while class actions require 
court approval of settlements.167  The result is a somewhat inconsistent pattern 
when it comes to whether and how formal offer rules apply in class actions.168 
Florida has an apparently unique procedural response to one aspect of 
these problems.  For putative class actions, it extends “the time for acceptance 
of a proposal for settlement . . . to 30 days after the order granting or denying 
certification is filed.”169  This approach at least reduces potential conflict 
between class representatives facing a favorable offer and possible duties to the 
class: “Now, proposed representatives can honor their commitment to the 
proposed class and know whether a class has been certified before deciding 
whether to accept a proposal for settlement.”170 
 
 
covered, and whether the discovery will result in annoyance, oppression, or 
undue burden or expense for the members of the class. 
 163. See Cal. Ct. R. 3.768. 
 164. See Md. R. Civ. P. 2-231(g) (“For purposes of discovery, only representative parties shall be treated 
as parties.  On motion, the court may allow discovery by or against any other member of the class.”). 
 165. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 42(f) (“Unnamed members of a class action are not to be considered as parties for 
purposes of discovery.”). 
 166. See generally 13 Moore’s, supra n. 28, ch. 68 (discussing offers of judgment under Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 68). 
 167. See id. § 68.03[3] (discussing application of Federal Rule 68 to class and derivative actions). 
 168. See id. (reflecting conflict in federal decisions on application of offer rule in class actions). 
 169. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.442. 
 170. Survey, supra n. 3, at 109. 
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D. Cy Pres and Fluid-Class Recoveries 
 
Problems arise when damage awards in class actions cannot be fully 
distributed to the class members who suffered losses.  Sometimes, for example, 
they cannot all be identified; other times they may not present necessary proofs 
of their claims.  That leaves leftover funds and brings the system into a world 
of less than fully satisfactory alternatives: return the money to the defendant 
(and reduce class counsel’s fee?)?; give extra recoveries to identified class 
members?; give the money to charity?; give it to the government?; etc.  
Responses have varied, among federal courts171 and in the states.  The 
American Law Institute’s Aggregate Litigation project currently proposes that 
cy pres settlements be permissible, even if courts would lack authority to order 
a cy pres remedy in a contested case, under limited circumstances: When 
leftover funds remain and could not economically be distributed to participating 
class members, then the money could go to “a recipient involving the same 
subject matter as the lawsuit that best approximates the interests being pursued 
by the class”172 (rather than the judge’s favorite charity). 
Many states appear not to have dealt with cy pres issues,173 and those 
that have take a considerable range of approaches.  To give prominent 
examples: California case law is fairly friendly to cy pres distributions and 
provides detailed guidance for the state’s courts, refusing to return the money 
to defendants and specifying a range of possible approaches.174  Illinois case 
law approves “fluid recovery” distribution of funds left over after payments to 
identifiable class members, in the form of reduced charges or to fund a project 
likely benefiting class members.175  The state now has new legislation, effective 
July 1, 2008, allowing residual funds from class-action settlements to go to tax-
exempt organizations under various conditions.176  A Louisiana appellate court 
has recently approved cy pres distribution of class-settlement proceeds, 
requiring as close as possible a parallel to intended use of the funds.177 
The Missouri Supreme Court has approved the possibility of parties 
agreeing on a cy pres distribution “for the indirect benefit of the class,” or in 
the absence of such a provision “appropriate” court orders for distribution of 
surplus funds including “to the appropriate state or political subdivisions where 
the class members reside.”178  A state appellate court, though, has disapproved 
 
 171. See generally 5 Moore’s, supra n. 28, § 23.171 (discussing general approval of cy pres distributions 
and some limits imposed on them). 
 172. PRINCIPLES, supra n. 51, § 3.07(c). 
 173. Or at least for many states the Mullenix treatise contains no discussion under its pertinent heading.  
See Mullenix, supra n. 1, § 8.04(A)(4) passim. 
 174. See State v. Levi Strauss & Co., 41 Cal. 3d 460, 473-476 (1986). 
 175. See Gordon v. Boden, 224 Ill. App. 3d 195, 204-206 (1991). 
 176. See Ill. Pub. Act 095-0479, accessible at 
  http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/publicacts/fulltext.asp?Name=095-0479 (accessed Dec. 14, 2007). 
 177. See Cavalier v. Mobil Oil Corp., 898 So. 2d 584, 588-589 (La. Ct. App. 2005). 
 178. Buchholz Mortuaries, Inc., v. Director of Revenue, 113 S.W.3d 192, 193 n. 1 (Mo. 2003). 
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distribution, without notice to the parties and opportunity, to a charity unrelated 
to the parties’ activities or to the relevant area.179  Texas appears to ban escheat 
of unclaimed funds to the state on statutory and constitutional grounds180 while 
allowing other public-use distributions at least in the absence of authority 
disallowing such settlements.181  Canadian provinces finally, have allowed cy 
pres distributions—including to third parties—to benefit class members even if 
they do not individually receive monetary relief, with the approach being 
justified at least in part on deterrence grounds emphasizing the defendant’s 
having to internalize costs of harm it inflicted.182  In the absence of rule 
guidance, decisional approaches are likely to remain diverse; but the 
temptations for judges and parties to indulge favorite causes with other 
people’s leftover money may call for observance of the Aggregate Litigation 
project’s cautionary suggestions. 
 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
 
For those steeped in American federal class-action lore, it is indeed 
important to remember that the familiar is not to be confused with the 
necessary.  Decades of practice may have made it difficult to contemplate some 
kinds of changes in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, but state and foreign 
practices provide a significant number of alternatives on some key points.  The 
three most important seem to be reduced emphasis on sheer numbers in some 
foreign systems, and relaxation of the predominance and notice requirements 
for common-question damage class actions.  Deeper research, particularly 
empirical investigation of experience under major alternatives, would be well 
advised before opening what could be Pandora’s boxes when it comes to 
significant changes in familiar language.  But both federal and state rulemakers 
are not lacking for models. 
 
 
 179. See Kan. Assn of Priv. Investigators v. Mulvihill, 159 S.W.3d 857, 861-862 (Mo Ct. App. 2005). 
 180. See State v. Snell, 950 S.W.2d 108, 112-113 (Tex. App. 1997). 
 181. See Northrup v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 72 S.W.3d 16, 22 (Tex. App. 2002). 
182. See Jones, supra  n. 35, at 128. 
